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SEARS ROEBUCK CO., and 
OTIS ELEVATOR, 
Defendants/Appellant, 
Case No.: 900135 CA 
Priority No.: 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT OTIS ELEVATOR 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is properly held by the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
The Supreme Court, prior to transfer, held jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court improperly denied a 
motion for new trial based on the excessive damage rule 
under Rule 59(a)(5). 
The standard of review is whether the trial court's 
denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion based upon 
juror disregard of competent evidence or influence of passion 
or prejudice, or a verdict manifestly against the weight of 
evidence, Battv v. Mitchell. 757 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 
1978), Price. Orem Inv. Co, v. Rawlins. Brown & 
Gunnell. 713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986). 
2. Whether the trial court improperly denied a 
new trial for insufficiency of the evidence based upon Rule 
59(a)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The standard of review is whether, viewing the 
evidence in light most favorable to the party who prevailed, 
the court concludes the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict. Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). 
RULES 
Rule 59(a)(5), (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(See Addendum for copy of the Rule verbatim.) 
Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See 
Addendum for copy of the Rule verbatim.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a personal injury claim which 
allegedly occurred in an Otis elevator at the Salt Lake 
downtown Sears store. Mr. Eisenstaedt claimed the 
elevator doors closed improperly causing him severe arm injury 
and nerve damage. The plaintiff pled negligence, breach of 
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warranty and strict liability. Defendant Sears was dismissed 
prior to trial. 
A jury trial was held on July 17, 18 and 19, 1989. 
The jury found Otis Elevator not negligent but returned a 
verdict for Mr. Eisenstaedt under theories of breach of 
warranty and strict liability. Mr. Eisenstaedt was awarded 
$17,250.00 in special damages plus $5,000.00 in general 
damages. The trial court denied defendant Otis Elevator's 
Motion for New Trial, Remittitur, and Jury Notwithstanding the 
Verdict and Otis has appealed the denials. (See Addendum for 
full copies of the jury verdict, judgment on the verdict, 
Motions for New Trial, and Memorandum Denying Motions for New 
Trial.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prior to April 9, 1986, Mr. Eisenstaedt 
suffered from partial paralysis from the hips down. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 25, hereinafter "Tr.") As a result of 
his partial paralysis, Mr. Eisenstaedt has used crutches and 
wheelchairs for ambulation. (Tr. at 149.) 
2. On the afternoon of April 9, 1986, 
Mr. Eisenstaedt and his wife were shopping at Sears. They 
wanted to utilize the elevator. Mr. Eisenstaedt was in his 
wheelchair. As the elevator doors opened, his wife began 
pushing him into the elevator. Mr. Eisenstaedt alleges that 
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the elevator doors closed prematurely, pinning his arms for two 
to five seconds. (Tr. p. 32, 78.) 
3. After he complained to Sears, Lisa Hurtado, 
a Sears security officer, inspected Mr. Eisenstaedt's arms to 
see if he was hurt. (Tr. p. 337.) His arms appeared 
normal. (Tr. p. 339.) He did not have any bruises, 
scraping, contusions, lacerations^ skin indentation, or 
apparent physical injury. (Tr. p. 338-39.) 
Mr. Eisenstaedt refused Sears7 offer of medical care. (Tr. 
p. 339.) 
4. Mr. Eisenstaedt then left the store and, 
utilizing his arms, drove 130 miles to Wendover, Nevada. 
Tr. p. 81.) 
5. Several days later, Mr. Eisenstaedt saw 
»r. Stream in Wendover, Nevada, complaining about pain in his 
eft arm. Dr. Stream referred him to Dr. John Provost. (Tr. 
». 38-39.) 
6. Dr. Provost is a board-certified orthopedic 
pecialist working in St. Mark's Hospital. (Tr. p. 91.) He 
nitially saw Mr. Eisenstaedt on April 30, 1986. Based on 
[r. Eisenstaedt's subjective complaints, Dr. Provost 
tentatively diagnosed tennis elbow and immobilized the left arm 
with a cast. (Tr. p. 96, 251.) The tennis elbow condition 
was consistent with Mr. Eisenstaedt's use of crutches. 
(Tr. p. 251.) 
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7. Dr. Provost treated Mr. Eisenstaedt until 
December 12, 1986. (Tr. p. 246.) 
8. Between April 3, 1986 and December 23, 1986, 
the plaintiff underwent five separate EMG and nerve study 
tests. None of the tests revealed significant problems. 
(Tr. p. 251, p. 317, p. 319, p. 235, p. 320.) The tests were 
completed by Dr. Ron Duerksen, Dr. Walter Reichert, and 
Dr. Dennis Thoen. 
9. Dr. Provost conducted grip strength tests but 
concluded that Mr. Eisenstaedt was not giving full effort. 
(Tr. p. 272.) In preparation for trial, Robert DeBry & 
Associates hired physical therapist Don Vernon to conduct 
strength tests. The tests did show some disparity between the 
right and left arms but were not substantiated by arm atrophy. 
(Tr. p. 114, 134.) 
10. Dr. Provost started to find it difficult to 
justify any disability or impairment rating because of the 
minimal physical findings. (Tr. p. 261.) Ultimately, he 
refused to assign any disability or impairment rating because 
the injury was "no big deal" according to the test findings. 
(Tr. p. 274.) 
11. Dr. Provost also questioned the veracity of 
his patient. He had a hard time equating Mr. Eisenstaedt,s 
complaints with the fact that there was no arm atrophy, or any 
positive EMG tests. (Tr. p. 276.) Dr. Provost testified 
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that in the absence of medical evidence, such complaints were 
typical where the patient was after some secondary gain or had 
an ulterior purpose. (Tr. p. 277.) Based on his findings, 
Dr. Provost testified that the plaintiff should have reasonable 
use of his arm. (Tr. p. 275.) 
12. After the incident occurred, Otis repairman 
Dave Joseph, immediately examined the elevator. He found that 
all components were working properly. (Tr. p. 332.) 
Repairman Mont Anderson also testified that the elevator was 
working properly. (Tr. p. 285.) Lisa Hurtado checked the 
elevator immediately after the incident found it was operating 
safely. (Tr. p. 343.) Charlie Schott, an elevator 
expert, testified that the elevator was fit for all its 
intended purposes, did not have any dangerous defect, and was 
well within code requirements for closing speed. (Tr. p. 
207, 217, 218.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. In light of the testimony of all the 
physicians, the maintenance men, the Sears security officer 
and the elevator expert, the jury awarded excessive damages to 
the plaintiff. There was a complete and consistent lack of 
positive findings on five separate EMG and nerve study 
tests. After two years of claimed total "helplessness," there 
was no muscle atrophy or tests warranting the complaint. 
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Plaintiff's own treating physician suspected plaintiff's 
veracity and concluded that the supposed injury was "no big 
deal." He testified that his patient's complaints likely 
resulted from ulterior purposes rather than actual injury. 
2. The liability verdict is not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. The only elevator expert 
testified that at worst, there was a safe malfunction. 
Testimony from all witnesses having elevator experience was 
that the elevator was functioning safely and that the elevator 
door speed was insufficient to cause injury. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
A. MR. EISENSTAEDT WAS AWARDED EXCESSIVE DAMAGES. 
Utah law provides that a new trial is warranted where 
the jury awarded "excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5). An award is 
properly set aside where the "jury disregards competent 
evidence," or the award is so "excessive beyond natural 
justification as to indicate the affect of improper factors in 
the determination," or that it "clearly appears that the award 
was rendered under [a] misunderstanding." Bennion v. 
LeGrand Johnson Construction. 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 
1985). A new trial is also proper when the "jury verdict is 
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manifestly against the weight of evidence," Price Orem 
Investment Co* v, Rollins, Brown & Gunnellf 713 P.2d 55, 
58 (Utah 1986), or when the jury has "misapplied or failed to 
take into account proven facts; . . . " Wellman v. Noble, 
366 P.2d 701# 704 (Utah 1961). (See also. Batty v. 
Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978): "Generally the 
amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for the jury and 
unless such an award clearly indicates the jury's disregard of 
competent evidence or the influence of passion or prejudice, 
the trial court may not interfere with the jury's 
determination.") 
In this case, the extensive medical evidence was 
uniformly against Mr. Eisenstaedt. His own treating 
physician, Dr. John Provost, and the testing physicians, 
Dr. Ron Duerksen and Dr. Walter Reichert, consistently 
testified there was no medical basis supporting 
Mr. Eisenstaedt. These three doctors were the only 
physicians who testified at trial. 
Dr. Provost was Mr. Eisenstaedt's treating 
physician. He saw Mr. Eisenstaedt at different times 
beginning April 30, 1986, through December 12, 1986. 
(Tr. p. 93, 246.) On April 30, 1986, Mr. Eisenstaedt 
complained of left arm and elbow pain radiating to the hand. 
However, Mr. Eisenstaedt had used crutches for years prior to 
the Sears' incident. Dr. Provost concluded that the complaints 
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amounted to nothing more than "tennis elbow" which could be 
caused by Mr. Eisenstaedt's continued use of crutches. 
(Tr. p. 251.) On April 3, 1986, an EMG test completed by 
Dr. Dennis Thoen buttressed the diagnosis of a mild tennis 
elbow. The April 3, 1986 EMG findings were at best "mild." 
Even "mild" findings, however, would result in substantially 
normal use of the arm. (Tr. p. 251.) However, based on 
Mr. Eisenstaedt's subjective complaints, Dr. Provost 
immobilized Mr. Eisenstaedt's arm by applying a cast. 
(Tr. p. 93.) 
Dr. Provost saw Mr. Eisenstaedt again on May 3, 
1986, while the patient was in the hospital for heart testing. 
On May 22, 1986, Dr. Provost removed the cast. 
(Tr. p. 103.) On June 3, 1986, Dr. Ron Duerksen, at the 
request of Dr. Provost, completed a second EMG and nerve 
study. Dr. Duerksen testified that he found that the arm was 
normal, with no nerve damage or entrapment. (Tr. p. 317.) 
As time went on, Dr. Provost found it more difficult 
to give credence to Mr. Eisenstaedt's complaints. The only 
evidence of any injury was Mr. Eisenstaedt's subjective 
verbal complaints. (Tr. p. 259.) Also, even assuming some 
"mild" findings from the April 3, 1986 EMG, the June 3, 1986 
EMG finding showed that the "mild" problem had been 
resolved. (Tr. p. 257.) 
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On July 17, 1986, Dr. Provost filled out a disability 
form allowing Mr. Eisenstaedt time off work. Nevertheless, 
Dr. Provost testified he had a hard time justifying the report 
because of the minimal physical findings. (Tr. p. 261.) The 
decision to entertain notions of impairment was based only on 
Mr. Eisenstaedt's subjective complaints. (Tr. p. 259.) 
On July 22, 1986, a third EMG study was completed. 
(Tr. p. 318.) Again, Dr. Duerksen found that the arm was 
normal. He found no evidence to substantiate 
Mr. Eisenstaedt/s complaints. (Tr. p. 319-320.) Dr. Provost 
found it more difficult to accept Mr. Eisenstaedt's 
complaints in the face of the continually normal EMG 
reports. He knew that an EMG test could not be faked and 
fully accepted the EMG results. (Tr. p. 254.) 
To assure accurate testing, Dr. Provost ordered a 
fourth EMG from a different physician. Accordingly, on 
August 13, 1986, Dr. Walter Reichert completed an EMG and 
nerve study tests. Dr. Reichert testified that the test 
results were normal. Based upon his findings, he would expect 
normal use of the patient's arm. (Tr. p. 235.) 
Based on the results of the fourth EMG, 
Mr. Eisenstaedt's claims of total "helplessness" and total 
"disability" in his left arm strained his physician's belief. 
If Mr. Eisenstaedt7s claims were genuine, Dr. Provost would 
expect to see significant EMG findings. (Tr. p. 260.) 
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Thus, Dr. Provost ruled out any consideration of surgery. 
(Tr. p. 267.) 
Dr. Provost's belief in his patient's veracity was 
further strained as a result of a series of grip strength tests 
he administered to Mr. Eisenstaedt. Dr. Provost conducted 
these tests to determine if relative strength between the right 
arm and the left was substantially different. The test 
revealed that the right-hand grip strength was significantly 
greater than the left-hand grip strength. However, the 
right-hand strength was so much greater, by factor of 28 to 1 
at one point, that Dr. Provost suspected the integrity of 
Mr. Eisenstaedt's attempt. Dr. Provost testified that the 
left-hand results were the weakest he had ever seen. Given the 
left-hand results, he would expect to see a completely severed 
ulnar nerve (Tr. p. 270) or that the patient was suffering 
from complete paralysis. (Tr. p. 273.) Mr. Eisenstaedt, 
however, had a completely normal ulnar nerve and did not have 
any arm paralysis. Further, given the huge disparity between 
the right- and left-hand grip strengths, Dr. Provost expected 
to see a half-inch to one full inch atrophy in the left forearm 
as compared to the right. (Tr. p. 271.) Nevertheless, there 
was no left forearm atrophy. (Tr. p. 272.) Accordingly, it 
appeared to Dr. Provost that Mr. Eisenstaedt was not really 
trying (Tr. p. 272), or on the other hand, was trying to 
artificially inflate his injury claim. 
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Dr. Provost ordered one final EMG for December 23, 
1986. Dr. Duerksen completed Mr. Eisenstaedt's fifth 
EMG. Again, test results were normal. (Tr. p. 320.) 
Dr. Provost came to the conclusion that in all 
actuality, Mr. Eisenstaedt enjoyed the use of his arm. 
(Tr. p. 275.) Dr. Provost testified that he could not equate 
the normal EMG's and lack of atrophy with Mr. Eisenstaedt's 
complaints. Dr. Provost concluded/ and so testified, that such 
complaints were not typical unless the suing patient was after 
some secondary gain or had ulterior motives in persisting with 
the claim. (Tr. p. 277.) As a result, Dr. Provost did not 
give any type of impairment or disability rating to the 
plaintiff because the alleged injury, according to all the 
medical evidence, was "no big deal." (Tr. p. 274.) The 
damage award indicates that the "jury disregarded [the] 
competent evidence," supplied by Dr. Provost, Dr. Duerksen, 
Dr. Reichert, and Dr. Thoen. Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1083. 
The award was "manifestly against the weight of evidence," 
price Orem Inv. Co., 713 P.2d at 58, in the form of five 
EMG nerve study tests totally discounting the plaintiff's 
claims of nerve damage, and the treating physician's conclusion 
that Mr. Eisenstaedt's supposed injury was "no big deal." 
There was a total absence of evidence supporting plaintiff's 
claims of "significant nerve damage" or severe injury to "both 
arms." (Plaintiff's Complaint, f 4, R. p. 3.) 
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The overwhelming medical testimony correlates with 
the testimony of Lisa Hurtado, the Sears' security agent. 
She saw Mr. Eisenstaedt immediately after the alleged 
incident. She inspected his arms and noted the total absence 
of bruises, scraping, contusions, lacerations, skin 
indentations or redness. As a result, she noted there was "no 
physical injury." (Tr. p. 339.) 
The medical evidence also accords with the elevator 
testimony of Charles Schott, Lisa Hurtado, David Joseph and 
Mont Anderson. David Joseph examined the elevator just after 
the incident occurred. He found that the door speed was normal 
and the closing devices acted properly. (Tr. p. 332.) Lisa 
Hurtado also put her arm in the elevator immediately after 
the incident and found that the door closing speed was 
insufficient to cause any injury to her arm. (Tr. p. 343.) 
Elevator expert Charles Schott testified that the door speed 
was proper. The manifest weight of evidence and the disregard 
of competent testimony led to an excessive award. Thus, a new 
trial is warranted. 
B. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT. 
Under Rule 59(a)(6), a new trial is proper where 
there is "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict . . . " An "insufficiency challenge" is appropriate 
where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
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prevailing party, is "insufficient to support the verdict." 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). The party 
challenging the verdict must "marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the verdict" and then show that the "evidence is 
insufficient to support it." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 
766, 769 (Utah 1985). While the burden on the appellant is not 
light, Cambelt International Co. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 
1242 (Utah 1987), if the evidence is "completely lacking or is 
so slight and convincing as to make the verdict plainly and 
reasonable and unjust" a new trial is warranted. King v. 
Feredav, 739 P.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1987). See also. 
Peats v. Commercial Security Bank. 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
In this case the jury found in favor of Otis 
Elevator on the negligence issue, but against Otis regarding 
breach of warranty of fitness and strict liability. The only 
evidence supporting verdicts on the breach of warranty and 
strict liability came from Mr. Eisenstaedt. 
Mrs. Eisenstaedt testified that the elevator doors came into 
contact with Mr. Eisenstaedt7s arms for approximately five 
seconds before releasing and released after she touched the 
elevator button. (Tr. p. 145.) Nevertheless, on 
cross-examination she admitted that she was "not good at time" 
and that, in her deposition, testified that the door closed on 
Mr. Eisenstaedt for one to two minutes. (Tr. p. 153.) 
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After the doors released Mr. Eisenstaedt, she pushed him into 
the elevator in order to continue shopping. (Tr. p. 154.) 
On its face, Mrs. Eisentaedt's testimony is so "slight and 
unconvincing" that it cannot support the verdict. The incident 
was so unremarkable to her that after the doors opened 
releasing her husband's arms, she continued her normal shopping 
routine. She went into the elevator to go to the next floor. 
Mr. Eisenstaedt's testimony about the incident does 
not add anything substantial. He stated that the doors opened 
for two to three seconds and then closed on his elbows for a 
couple of seconds. (Tr. p. 78.) He said that the elevator 
doors caused "severe pain" to his elbows, (Tr. p. 32.) and 
later alleged "severe nerve damage." However, his own 
physician testified that there was no nerve damage and 
subsequently described the injury as "no big deal." The 
overwhelming medical testimony demonstrates the insufficiency 
of Mr. Eisenstaedt's claim of nerve damage. Indeed, five 
EMG reports absolutely refute the claim. 
Plaintiff also called elevator expert Charles 
Schott in his liability case. Mr. Schott did testify that, 
assuming the truth of Mr. Eisenstaedt's testimony, the 
opening and closing of the doors would represent an unintended, 
minor malfunction. (Tr. p. 172, 175 and 191.) Nevertheless, 
he testified it would be a safe malfunction because the door 
speed was insufficient to cause any damage. (Tr. p. 175.) 
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Thus, even assuming malfunction, the elevator door was fit for 
safe passenger travel. (Tr. at 175.) The door closing speed 
was well within the safety code specifications of thirty pounds 
of thrust. (Tr. at 207.) In sum, Mr. Schott testified 
that the elevator did not contain any dangerous defect and that 
it was fully fit and safe for its intended purposes. (Tr. p. 
217.) 
C O N C L U S I O N 
On the basis of the foregoing reasons, Otis 
Elevator respectfully requests a new trial. 
DATED this 21 day of July, 1990. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Bruce R.Garner 
Attorneys*' for Defendant 
Otis Elevator Company 
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Civil No. 860909577PI 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
We, the jury, based upon a preponderance of the 
evidence find on the Special Verdict submitted to us as follows: 
1. At the time and place in question and under the 
conditions as shown by the evidence, was the defendant, Otis 
Elevator, negligent? 
Yes No 
If your answer is Yes, go on to Question No. 2. If your answer 
is No, go to Question No. 3. 








3. Did the functioning of the Otis elevator in 
question on April 9, 1986 breach the defendant's implied warranty 
of merchantability? J^I Yes Ls^ No 
If your answer to isv Yes, go on to Question No. 4. If your 
answer is No, go on to Question No. 5. 
4. Was the defendant's breach of that implied 
warranty of merchantability a proximate cause of injury to the 
plaintiff? 
Yes \jS No 
Go on to Question No. 5. 
5. Did the functioning of the Otis elevator in 
question on April 9, 1986 breach the defendant's implied warranty 
of fitness for particular purpose? 
Yes ^ ^ ^ No 
If your answer is Yes, go on to Question No. 6. If your answer 
is No, go on to Question No. 7. 
6. Was the defendant's breach of that implied 
warranty of fitness for particular purpose a proximate cause of 
injury to'the plaintiff? 
Yes No 
Go on to Question No. 7. 
7. Was the elevator in question in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user? 
Yes \y^ No 
If your answer is Yesf go on Question No. 8. If your answer is 
No, go on to Question No. 9. 
8. Was that defective condition of the elevator in 
question a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff? 
Yes \*r^ No 
Go on to Question No. 9. 
9. If you answered Yes to Questions 1 and 2 or Yes to 
Questions Nos. 3 and 4 or Yes to Questions Nos. 5 and 6 or Yes to 
Questions Nos. 7 and 8, please answer Question No. 10. If not, 
return this Special Verdict to the bailiff now. 
10. What amount would fairly and adequately compensate 
the plaintiff for the injuries he sustained as a result of the 
accident in question? 
Special Damages $ / ~7 35'£ . {?£> 
General Damages $ ^£r~~~~* *HT. /f /iC^ 
TOTAL $ /~V V ' J7»T7**7*» 
DATED this /<? day of July, 1989. ^) 3 -y *~~A /*~JX, 
f / 4- v-rl>. • •  -. /- r-A 
FOREPERSON 
V.V 
GORDON K. JENSEN - A4351 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 04107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 






i JUDGMENT ON 
i THE VERDICT 
Civil No. 860909577PI 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
This matter was tried to a jury on July 17 , 18 and 19, 
1989, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. Gordon K. Jensen of 
Robert J. DeBry and Associates represented the plaintiff. Bruce 
R. Garner of Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson represented the 
defendant. The liability of the defendant was submitted to the 
jury on four theories: Negligence; breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability; breach of implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose; and strict products liability. 
The jury returned a verdict finding that the defendant 
was not negligent, but that the defendant had breached its 
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose and that the elevator in question was in a 
(ii) 
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate user 
or consumer and, therefore, liable to the plaintiff under strict 
products liability. 
The jury further found that these breaches of implied 
warranty and the defective condition of the elevator were the 
proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. 
Based on those findings of liability and causation 
against the defendant, the jury returned the following verdict on 
damages: 
What amount would fairly and adequately 
compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he 
sustained as a result of the accident in 
question? 
Special Damages $17,250.00 
General Damages 5,000 . 00 
TOTAL $22,250.00 
The verdict was appropriately dated and signed by the 
foreperson. Based upon the Special Verdict of the jury; 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be 
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as 
follows: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant for special damages in the amount of $17,250. 
2 
2. The plaintiff is awarded $4,521-78 as pre-
judgment interest on special damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-44. This represents interest at 8% per annum on $17,250 
from April 9, 1986 to July 19, 1989. 
3. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendants for general damages in the amount of $5,000. 
4. The plaintiff is awarded post-judgment interest 
against the defendant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4, 
consistent with this judgment, accruing at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
5. The plaintiff is awarded his costs of court in the 
amount of $543.95. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
F.RANK G, NOEL 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
BRUCE R. GARNER 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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RTIFICATE OF MAILING /I 
it on the ^l<M day of y ^ iXJj^j 
:t copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT^ON TH 
CE
I certify that 
1989, a true and correc v E 
VERDICT (Eisenstaedt v. Sears, et al) was mailed, U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
Bruce R. Garner 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant Otis Elevator Company 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
2185-009/ek ^ 
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JOHN L. YOUNG (A3591) 
BRUCE R. GARNER (A4322) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Otis Elevator Co. 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. BOX 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




SEARS ROEBUCK CO., and 
OTIS ELEVATOR, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT OTIS ELEVATOR'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
A NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. C86-9577 
Judge Frank G.'Noel 
Defendant, Otis Elevator Company, pursuant to Rule 
50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves this 
Court for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the 
alternative, a new trial. This Motion is supported by the 
Memorandum. 
(iii) 
DATED this £»S> day of -August, 1989. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Bruce R. Garner 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Otis Elevator Company 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoina instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
this Jpsf** day of August, 1989, to the following counsel of 
record: 
Gordon K. Jensen, Esq. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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JOHN L. YOUNG (A3591) 
BRUCE R. GARNER (A4322) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Otis Elevator Co. 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




SEARS ROEBUCK CO., and 
OTIS ELEVATOR, 
Defendants. 
i DEFENDANT OTIS ELEVATOR 
I MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, 
i OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
I FOR REMITTITUR 
1 Civil No. C86-9577 
l Judge Frank G.'Noel 
Defendant, Otis Elevator Company, pursuant to Rule 
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves this 
Court for remittitur or a new trial. A Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in support of this Motion is attached. 
DATED this 2-S day of August, 1939. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Bruce R. 
Attorneys fbr Defendant 
Otis Elevator Company 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
this ^ j^^day of August, 1989, to the following counsel of 
record: 
Gordon K. Jensen, Esq. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EISENSTAEDT, ROBERT 
VS 





CASE NUMBER 860909577 PI 
DATE 09/28/89 
HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. JENSEN, GORDON K. 
D. ATTY. BURTON, ROBERT A. 
THE COURT HAS REVIEWED DEFTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR 
A REMITTITUR TOGETHER WITH THE MEMOS FILED IN CONNECTION THERE-
WITH AND NOW RULES AS FOLLOWS: IT IS NOT FOR THE COURT TO WEIGH 
THE EVIDENCE NOR TO SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE JURY 
ON FACTUAL ISSUES. THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THERE WAS 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON BOTH THE LIABILITY AND DAMAGE ISSUES UPON 
WHICH THE JURY COULD BASE ITS VERDICT. FOR THAT REASON AND FOR 
THE REASONS STATED IN PLTFS MEMO THE COURT DENIES DEFTS MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A REMITTITUR. COUNSEL FOR PLTF IS TO 
PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THIS RULING AND SUBMIT IT TO 
THE COURT FOR SIGNATURE. 
(iv) 
Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in.law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion Rule 606. 
for new trial, § 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial, 
Rule 61. 
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( V ) 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 50 
presenting the issue to trial court for final de-
termination, trial court's determination that 
jury had considered interest issue in its delib-
eration and that award in fact incorporated an 
interest payment was not arbitrary or capri-
cious and would not be altered on appeal. Ute-
Cal Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980). 
Objections to questions. 
Where defendant did not object to questions 
submitted in special verdict, he cannot on ap-
peal raise the issue that the questions were 
confusing. Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 
P.2d 264 (1957). 
Proximate cause issue. 
Where the case is submitted under a general 
verdict, proximate cause is for the jury. 
Milligan v. Capitol Furn. Co., 8 Utah 2d 383, 
335 P.2d 619 (1959). 
Role of jury. 
—Special verdicts. 
Special verdicts that plaintiff both suffered a 
specified amount of damages and was guilty of 
contributory negligence were not inconsistent 
and thereby void, since in special verdict jury 
finds facts and court applies law. Brigham v. 
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 
P.2d 393 (1970). 
Special interrogatories. 
Whenever there is uncertainty or doubt in 
connection with the correlation of interrogator-
ies with each other and their answers, they 
should be so interpreted as to harmonize with 
the findings of the jury if that can-reasonably 
be done. Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 
P.2d 273 (1952). 
When a general verdict will settle the issues 
it should be used, but the court should take 
advantage of special verdicts when specific is-
sues cannot otherwise be reached. Baker v. 
Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 264 (1957). 
There is no impropriety in submitting spe-
cial interrogatories if the court so desires. 
Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 
564 (1960). 
Trial court did not err in submitting special 
interrogatories instead of a general verdict as 
requested by plaintiff. This rule sanctions such 
procedure. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 15 
Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964). 
Where jury answers to special interrogator-
ies submitted on all disputed material issues 
are adverse to the defendant, the court prop-
erly entered judgment for the plaintiff. S & F 
Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (Utah 
1974). 
Cited in Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 
(Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trial 
§§ 1175 to 1181. 
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 526 to 573. 
A.L.R. — Submission of special interroga-
tories in connection with general verdict under 
Federal Rule 49(b), and state counterparts, 6 
A.L.R.3d 438. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Competency of juror's statement or affidavit 
to show that verdict in civil case was not cor-
rectly reported, 18 A.L.R.3d 1132. 
Validity of verdict or verdicts by same jury 
in personal injury action awarding damages to 
injured spouse but denying recovery to other 
spouse seeking collateral damages, or vice 
versa, 66 A.L.R.3d 472. 
Products liability: inconsistency of verdicts 
on separate theories of negligence, breach of 
warranty, or strict liability, 41 A.L.R.4th 9. 
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 346 to 366. 
Rule 50, Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves 
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may 
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having 
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not 
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a 
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for 
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific 
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed 
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
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(vi) 
Rule 50 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a mo-
tion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for 
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to 
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment 
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, 
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial 
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the 
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict 
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested 
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided 
for m Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on 
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be 
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall spec-
ify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the 
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon 
does not affect the finality of the judgment In case the motion for a new 
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has other-
wise ordered In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally 
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error m that denial; and if 
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in 
accordance with the order of the appellate court 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respon-
dent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate 
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a 
new trial shall be granted. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially identical to Rule 50, F R C P 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
this VI day of July, 1990, to the following counsel of record: 
George Waddoups, Esq. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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